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Abstract
Utilizing common resources is always a dilemma for community members. While
cooperator players restrain themselves and consider the proper state of resources,
defectors demand more than their supposed share for a higher payoff. To avoid the
tragedy of the common state, punishing the latter group seems to be an adequate
reaction. This conclusion, however, is less straightforward when we acknowledge the
fact that resources are finite and even a renewable resource has limited growing
capacity. To clarify the possible consequences, we consider a coevolutionary model
where beside the payoff-driven competition of cooperator and defector players the level
of a renewable resource depends sensitively on the fraction of cooperators and the
total consumption of all players. The applied feedback-evolving game reveals that
beside a delicately adjusted punishment it is also fundamental that cooperators should
pay special attention to the growing capacity of renewable resources. Otherwise, even
the usage of tough punishment cannot save the community from an undesired end.
Author summary
Our proposed model considers not only the fundamental dilemma of individual and
collective benefits but also focuses on their impacts on the environmental state. In
general, there is a strong interdependence between individual actions and the actual
shape of environment that can be described by means of a co-evolutionary model.
Such approach recognizes the fact that even if our common-pool resources are partly
renewable, they have limited growth capacities hence a depleted environment is unable
to recover and reach a sustainable level again. This scenario would have a dramatic
consequence on our whole society, therefore we should avoid it by punishing those who
are not exercising restrain. We provide analytical and numerical evidences which
highlight that punishment alone may not necessarily be a powerful tool to maintain a
healthy shape of environment for the benefit of future generations. Cooperator actors,
who are believed to take care of present state of our environment, should also consider
carefully the growth capacity of renewable resources.
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Introduction
Overexploitation of common-pool resources is a fundamental problem that can be
identified in several seemingly different ecological systems [1, 2]. A well-known
example is the danger of overfishing. Fishermen are motivated to catch the maximum
amount of fish because restraint could only work if all others are behaving similarly.
Otherwise, fish are driven to extinction which is the worst scenario for everyone [3, 4].
Similarly, we can continue this list endlessly by giving further examples, like
overgrazing of common pasture lands, where individual short-term benefit seems to be
in conflict with long-term interest of a larger population. The mutual feature of these
cases is human activity influences the actual state of resources which has a negative
feedback for not only those who degrade the environment but also for the whole
community. We stress that this problem is not restricted to human-related activities,
but may also appear at microscopic level including microbes, bacterias, and
viruses [5–10], which explains why the problem of common-pool resource exploitation
is an intensively studied research area of several disciplines [11–13].
It is a fundamental point that the sustainable use of common-pool resources is
strongly based on the interdependence of resource and social dynamics [14]. On the
one hand, the dynamics of resources, in particular renewable resources, are influenced
by some ecological factors, such as the resource growth rate and the carrying
capacity [14, 15]. On the other hand, these resources are also influenced by human
behaviors on how to use them. Meanwhile, the shape of a dynamical resource also
influences the prosperity of human well-being, which triggers frequency-dependent
changes in individual strategies [16]. Thus, the interaction of resource dynamics and
the evolution of individual-based behavior can be captured properly by a
feedback-evolving game model where both variables are in the focus of governing
equations [15–19].
A frequently recommend solution for sustaining the requested level of common-pool
resource could be to punish defectors for over-harvesting [20–31]. In parallel, some
other related control mechanisms, like ostracism or voluntary enforcement, are also
discussed as viable solutions to the original problem [32, 33]. Importantly, the
consequence of top-down regulation, which is based on inspection, permanent
monitoring of agents and punishment, has been used for the forest commons
management [34], but still begs for clarification especially in the presence of renewable
resources.
Thus, in this work our principal interest is to explore how the application of
punishment and inspection influences the competition of strategies when the benefit of
given strategies depends sensitively on the actual state of environment. Furthermore,
in our approach the common resource is considered as a dynamically renewable system
which is also influenced by a feedback of individual strategies. This interdependence
can be modeled by a co-evolutionary system where both strategies and environmental
resources are subject to change. In our work, we depict this interdependent
relationship by using the replicator equation for the evolution of strategies and the
logistic growth model for the resource dynamics [35, 36], which provides a novel
approach in the field of socio-ecological dynamics, to our knowledge. Indeed, some
theoretical models have already raised the concept of environmental
coupling [15, 16, 37, 38], but our present approach considers the growing capacity of a
renewable resource explicitly. Additionally, punishment and permanent monitoring
(inspection) are used as a control mechanism for blocking overexploitation of the
common resource. We demonstrate that in addition to a delicately adjusted
punishment regime, the growing capacity of renewable resource is fundamental for
keeping resources at a sustainable level.
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Materials and methods
We consider a population of individuals who all use a common resource at different
levels. While the resource amount y in the common pool is limited, we assume that it
is partly renewable and its dynamics can be described by the frequently used logistic
population growth model [35, 36]. Accordingly, the dynamical change of the resource
amount induced by its environment factor is given by y˙ = ry(1− y/Rm), where r is the
intrinsic growth rate and Rm is the carrying capacity of resource pool. Furthermore,
for the proper utilization of the resource, individuals are allocated an amount of
resource from the common pool, which depends on the total resource amount y at a
given time. According to the allocation rule, we suppose that the legal amount that
each individual can be allocated from the pool is bl = bmy/Rm, where bm is the
maximal resource portion that each individual is allowed to use per unit of time when
the amount of the common pool y reaches Rm. Evidently, this individual limit portion
satisfies bm ≤ Rm/N , where N is the total number of individuals in the community.
For simplicity, we assume that individuals choose between two basically different
strategies. The first group is called as cooperators or “law-abiding” individuals who
follow the allocation rule and restrain their use to bl amount from the resource. The
other group, called as defectors or “violators”, ignores the allocation rule and utilizes
the common pool more intensively by getting a larger bv > bl amount. Here we
suppose that bv = bl(1 + α), where α > 0 characterizes the severity of defection.
In order to avoid resource exploitation, we introduce a centrally organized
inspection and punishing mechanism often used in realistic resource management
systems [28, 34]. In particular, we assume that defection is detected with a probability
p (0 < p < 1), which is the probability of detecting a defector during a time unit. If an
individual is identified for overexploiting common resources, then it will be punished
with a fine β (β > 0) which is reduced from his collected payoff. In this way, the
parameter p characterizes the effectiveness of monitoring system while the parameter
β describes how severe the applied punishment.
To explore the possible impact of inspection and punishment on the evolutionary
process, we consider a well-mixed population and employ the replicator equation that
describes the time evolution of competing strategies [35]. If we denote the fraction of
cooperators by x then the governing equation is
x˙ = x(1 − x)(PL − PV ), (1)
where PL and PV are the payoffs of law-abiding individual (cooperator) and violator
(defector) players, respectively. Notice that a player’s income is originated from the
common-pool resource, although there is a coupling between individual payoff
obtained from the feedback-evolving game and resource dynamics [15]. Thus, in our
study for simplicity we assume that the related payoff values are directly written as
PL = bl and PV = bv − pβ for cooperators and defectors, respectively.
In agreement with the co-evolutionary concept which considers the feedback of
individual acts on the actual state of resource, the governing equation of common
resource abundance can be extended as follows
y˙ = ry(1− y/Rm)−N [blx+ (1 − x)bv]. (2)
In the next section we analyze and discuss the possible equilibrium points of the
above coupled equation system. Furthermore we extend our study by presenting the
results of individual-based Monte Carlo simulations as a supplement to support the
validity of our mathematical analysis for wider conditions.
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Results
Equilibrium states of the feedback-evolving dynamical system
By substituting the payoff values into Eq. 1, we have the following equation system

x˙ = x(1 − x)(pβ −
y
Rm
bmα)
y˙ = ry(1 − y/Rm)−N
y
Rm
bm[1 + (1− x)α].
This equation system has at most five fixed points which are [x, y] = [0, 0],
[0, Rm −
bmN(1+α)
r
], [1, 0], [1, Rm −
Nbm
r
], and [1 + 1
α
− Rmr
αbmN
+ pβRmr
α2b2
m
N
, pβRm
bmα
],
respectively. Here the first four are boundary fixed points, while the last one is an
interior fixed point. By calculating the first order partial derivaties [1], the Jacobian
matrix of our system can be written as
J =
[
(1− 2x)(pβ − αbmy
Rm
) αbmx(x−1)
Rm
αbmNy
Rm
r − bmN(1+α−αx)+2ry
Rm
]
.
The specific form of this matrix at the above mentioned fixed points are
J(0, 0) =
[
pβ 0
0 r − bmN(1+α)
Rm
]
,
J(1, 0) =
[
−pβ 0
0 r − bmN
Rm
]
,
J(0, Rm −
Nbm(1+a)
r
) =
[
pβ + αbm[(1+α)bmN−Rmr]
Rmr
0
αbmN [Rmr−(1+α)bmN ]
Rmr
(1+α)bmN−Rmr
Rm
]
,
J(1, Rm −
Nbm
r
) =
[
αbm(Rmr−bmN)
Rmr
− pβ 0
αbmN(Rmr−bmN)
Rmr
bmN−Rmr
Rm
]
,
and
J(1 + 1
α
− Rmr
αbmN
+ pβRmr
α2b2
m
N
, pβRm
bmα
) =
[
0 ( 1
α
− Rmr
αbmN
+ pβRmr
α2b2
m
N
)[ bm(1+α)
Rm
− r
N
+ pβr
αbmN
]
Npβ − pβr
αbm
]
.
The stability of these fixed points can be determined from the sign of the
eigenvalues of the Jacobian [1]. It is easy to see that the eigenvalues of the matrices for
the boundary fixed points are the corresponding diagonal elements. Hence, the
stability of these fixed points depend exclusively on the signs of the diagonal elements
of the related matrices. In addition, the trace of the last Jacobian is negative, hence
the interior fix point has at least one negative eigenvalue. It also involves that the
stability of the unique interior fixed point depends only on the sign of
( 1
α
− Rmr
αbmN
+ pβRmr
α2b2
m
N
)[ bm(1+α)
Rm
− r
N
+ pβr
αbmN
] term. For further analysis let us denote
ec =
bmN
Rm
and ed =
bmN(1+α)
Rm
respectively, representing the gain rates of cooperators
and defectors in a population from the common resource. It also involves that we have
0 < ec ≤ 1 and ec < ed.
In the following, we distinguish three substantially different parameter regions
where the distinction is based on the actual intrinsic growth rate value of the
renewable common pool resource.
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Slowly growing resource pool
First we consider the case when the resource pool is recovering slowly due to small
intrinsic grow rate, which assumes that 0 < r < ec < ed. In this situation, we have
rRm < bmN , and accordingly the system has only two fixed points in the parameter
space of 0 ≤ x ≤ 1 and y ≥ 0. They are [0, 0] and [1, 0], respectively. Here the largest
eigenvalue of J(0, 0) is positive, whereas the largest eigenvalue of J(1, 0) is negative
due to the small value of r. Consequently, the fixed point [0, 0] is unstable, while the
fixed point [1, 0] is stable. For the special case of r = ec, we find that one eigenvalue of
the Jacobian matrix at the fixed point [1, 0] is zero and the other one is negative. In
the SI text, we further provide the stability analysis of the fixed point by using the
center manifold theorem [1].
A representative time evolution of the cooperation level and the abundance of
common resource pool for 0 < r < ec < ed is plotted in Fig. 1. It suggests that while
the inspection and punishing mechanisms are capable to drive the system toward a full
cooperator state, but this destination remains still unsatisfactory because the resource
pool becomes fully depleted. This result warrants that it is not enough to be
cooperator and consider only the actual shape of common resource pool. If the
intrinsic growing rate of the latter is too low, then users should take a much lower
share from the pool than it is believed naively based on the present status. Otherwise
the common resource pool is unable to renew and the high cooperation level becomes
useless.
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
Sy
st
em
 s
ta
te
s
0 20 40 60 80 100
Time
0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 10
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
0
Fraction of cooperators, x
Re
so
uc
e 
ra
tio
, y
/R
m
x
y/Rm
A B
Fig 1. Replicator dynamics for slowly growing resource. Panel A: Time
evolution of the fraction of cooperators and the resource abundance ratio. Panel B:
Phase portrait on x− y/Rm plane for r < ec < ed. Filled circle represents a stable
fixed point, while open circle represents an unstable fixed point. For r < ec < ed the
cooperation level is satisfactory in the final state, but resource abundance becomes
depleted due to low growing resource rate. Parameters are r = 0.3, N = 1000,
Rm = 1000, p = 0.5, α = 0.5, β = 0.5, and bm = 0.5.
Moderately growing resource pool
If the intrinsic growth rate of resource pool is moderate, means 0 < ec < r < ed, then
the conclusion is more subtle. In this situation, we have bmN < rRm < bmN(1 + α)
and 1 + 1
α
− Rmr
αbmN
+ pβRmr
α2b2
m
N
> 0. In dependence of the efficiency of inspection and
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punishment we can distinguish two main cases. Note that the combined effect of these
institutions can be characterized by the product of p and β parameters. The first case
is when they are efficient hence their product exceeds pβ > bmα(1 −
ec
r
). In this case
1 + 1
α
− Rmr
αbmN
+ pβRmr
α2b2
m
N
> 1 is also fulfilled. As a result, the system has three fixed
points which are [0, 0], [1, 0], and [1, Rm −
Nbm
r
], respectively. According to the sign of
the largest eigenvalues [0, 0] and [1, 0] are unstable, while [1, Rm −
Nbm
r
] is a stable
fixed point. This result suggests that the system reaches an equilibrium point where
all participants share the common pool cooperatively and the renewable resource is
capable to maintain a sustainable level. This case is illustrated in the first column of
Fig. 2.
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Fig 2. Replicator dynamics for moderately growing resource. Top panels
show the time evolution of the fraction of cooperators and the resource abundance
ratio for different parameter values when ec < r < ed. Bottom panels show the related
phase portraits on x− y/Rm plane. Parameters for Panels A and B: r = 0.6,
N = 1000, Rm = 1000, p = 0.5, α = 0.5, β = 0.5, and bm = 0.5; for Panels C and D:
r = 0.6, N = 1000, Rm = 1000, p = 0.05, α = 0.5, β = 0.5, and bm = 0.5; for Panels E
and F: r = 0.6, N = 1000, Rm = 1000, p = 0.01, α = 0.5, β = 0.1, and bm = 0.5.
These plots suggest that a sustainable state can be reached for appropriate inspection
and punishment level, but the depleted environment state cannot be avoided if these
institutions are ineffective.
When the inspection-punishment institutions are less effective, then the term
bmα(1−
ec
r
) exceeds pβ products. In this case 1 + 1
α
− Rmr
αbmN
+ pβRmr
α2b2
m
N
< 1 and the
system has four fixed points. They are [0, 0], [1, 0], [1, Rm −
Nbm
r
], and
[1 + 1
α
− Rmr
αbmN
+ pβRmr
α2b2
m
N
, pβRm
bmα
], respectively. Here only the last fixed point is stable
while the first three are unstable. In equilibrium cooperators and defectors coexist at
a finite resource abundance which is inversely proportional to α that characterizes how
intensively defector players over exploit the common resource. The equilibrium
resource level is linearly proportional to the pβ product, while the first part of the
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equilibrium fixed point contains a term which is free from pβ. This means that the
stable fixed point drifts toward y = 0 axis faster than to the x = 0 axis as we weaken
the impact of inspection-punishment institutions. Consequently, when the impact of
inspection and punishment tends to zero-limit then the system still remains in a mixed
state of cooperators and defectors but it has no particular importance because the
environment becomes depleted. This is illustrated in the right column of Fig. 2 where
the stable fixed point approached the horizontal axis as we lower p that is the
probability of successful detection of overexploitation.
In the special case when pβ = bmα(1 −
ec
r
), we find that there are three fixed
points in the system, which are [0, 0], [1, 0], and [1, Rm −
Nbm
r
], respectively. But one
eigenvalue of the Jacobian matrix at the fixed point [1, Rm −
Nbm
r
] is zero and the
other one is negative. In the SI text, we provide the stability analysis of the fixed
point by using the center manifold theorem [1]. Furthermore, we provide the
theoretical analysis of the equilibrium points for the special case of r = ed.
Rapidly growing resource pool
Finally we discuss the case when the intrinsic growth rate of resource is large enough
to exceed both the gain rate of cooperators ec and the gain rate of defectors ed. Here,
we have rRm > bmN and rRm > bmN(1 + α). As previously, we can distinct two
significantly different cases depending on the power of inspection and punishment
institutions. If they are strong enough and the product of pβ exceeds bmα(1 −
ec
r
),
then we have 1+ 1
α
− Rmr
αbmN
+ pβRmr
α2b2
m
N
> 1. In this case the system has four fixed points
which are [0, 0], [1, 0], [0, Rm −
bmN(1+α)
r
], and [1, Rm −
Nbm
r
], respectively. While the
first three are unstable, the last one is a stable fixed point. This means that the
system evolves into a full cooperator state where environmental resource stabilizes at a
sustainable level. This level depends practically on the growth rate of resource. A
representative phase portrait is plotted in the left column of Fig. 3.
If the above mentioned institutions are less powerful, then the product pβ cannot
beat bmα(1−
ec
r
) value. Hence we have 1 + 1
α
− Rmr
αbmN
+ pβRmr
α2b2
m
N
< 1. Depending on the
actual strength of inspection and punishment we can distinguish two subcases here.
First, when the above mentioned institutions are still considerable, pβ exceeds
bmα(1−
ed
r
) and the term 1 + 1
α
− Rmr
αbmN
+ pβRmr
α2b2
m
N
is positive. As a result, the system
has five fixed points which are [0, 0], [0, Rm −
bmN(1+α)
r
], [1, 0], [1, Rm −
Nbm
r
], and
[1 + 1
α
− Rmr
αbmN
+ pβRmr
α2b2
m
N
, pβRm
bmα
], respectively. Here only the last fixed point is stable
while all the others are unstable. This scenario is illustrated in the middle column of
Fig. 3. From this result we can conclude that a reasonably strong external institution
is capable to maintain the coexistence of cooperator and defectors states. Their
fractions depend principally on the difference between resource usages of strategies
which is characterized by the parameter α.
According to the second subcase, when the institutions are too weak and pβ
product cannot exceed bmα(1−
ed
r
), the term 1 + 1
α
− Rmr
αbmN
+ pβRmr
α2b2
m
N
is negative. In
this case the system has four fixed points which are [0, Rm −
bmN(1+α)
r
], [0, 0], [1, 0],
and [1, Rm −
Nbm
r
], respectively. Here only the first fixed point is stable, while the rest
are unstable. In this situation, which is illustrated in the right column of Fig. 3, the
evolution terminates into a full defection state. Still the latter is a sustainable state
because the strong growing capacity of resource is capable to compensate to greediness
of defector players.
Finally, we point out that there exist two special cases of αbm(1 −
ec
r
) = pβ and
αbm(1−
ed
r
) = pβ for the rapidly growing resource pool situation. We provide the
theoretical analysis for the equilibrium points in these two special cases in the SI text.
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Fig 3. Replicator dynamics for rapidly growing resource. Top panels show the
time evolution of the fraction of cooperators and the resource abundance ratio for
different parameter values when ec < ed < r. Bottom panels show the related phase
portraits on x− y/Rm plane. Parameters for Panels A and B: r = 1.0, N = 1000,
Rm = 1000, p = 0.5, α = 0.5, β = 0.5, and bm = 0.5; for Panels C and D: r = 1.0,
N = 1000, Rm = 1000, p = 0.2, α = 0.5, β = 0.5, and bm = 0.5; for Panels E and F:
r = 1.0, N = 100, Rm = 100, p = 0.1, α = 0.5, β = 0.5, and bm = 0.5. Due to the large
intrinsic growth rate, the environmental resource will never be depleted. The strength
of external institutions determines the relation of competing strategies in the
equilibrium state.
In addition, in order to help readers to overview easily the evolutionary stable states
of our feedback-evolving dynamical system for different parameter regions, we present
an illustrative plot of the dynamical regimes in the parameter space (r, pβ), as shown
in Fig. 4. We use different colors to distinguish the qualitatively different solutions for
different parameter values.
Monte Carlo simulations
To support the robustness of the predictions made by our presented mathematical
analysis, we perform Monte Carlo simulations [40–42] which may serve as an
alternative approach to explore the possible coevolutionary dynamics. Indeed, in some
cases this alternative approach, which contains stochastic elements and utilizes
microscopic dynamics, goes beyond the limitations of macroscopic equations and
provides alternative outcomes of evolutionary dynamics that are absent from a
well-mixed behavior [41]. In the present case, however, this technique confirms our
previous findings, and hence underlines the broader robustness of our observations.
In the Monte Carlo simulations, initially each individual in the population is
chosen to violate or to follow the allocation rule. These strategies are denoted by
sv = 0 and sl = 1 respectively. In agreement with the previous setup a law-abiding or
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[1, Rm-Nbm/r] [1, Rm-Nbm/r] ec = Nbm/Rm
Fig 4. A representative plot of evolutionary outcomes on the phase plane.
Different colors are used to distinguish qualitatively different solutions in the
parameter space (r, pβ). This plot highlights that the inner dynamical feature of
renewable resource could be a decisive factor that can derogate the expected
consequence of punishment.
cooperator player gets an amount y(t)bm/Rm from resource which provides his payoff
value. Here y(t) describes the actual state of resource pool at time step t.
Alternatively, a defector who violates the allocation rule takes a larger amount
y(t)bm/Rm(1 + α) from the common resource pool. However, the whole population is
inspected and defection is identified with a probability p. In this case the identified
defector player is punished and a fine β is reduced from his payoff. Technically, it
means that a defector collects a payoff Pi = (1 + α)y(t)bm/Rm − β with probability p,
otherwise his final payoff is Pi = (1 + α)y(t)bm/Rm.
Because of the feedback mechanism the total amount of common resources is
updated according to the rule
y(t+ 1) = y(t) + ry(t)[1 −
y(t)
Rm
]−
N∑
i
[si
y(t)bm
Rm
+ (1− si)
y(t)bm(1 + α)
Rm
] ,
where both the intrinsic growth of resource and the exploitation effect are considered.
According to the strategy evolution each individual i has a chance to imitate the
strategy of another randomly chosen individual j. If Pi < Pj , then the strategy
transfer occurs with the probability
q =
Pj − Pi
M
,
where M ensures the proper normalization and is given by the maximum possible
difference between the payoffs of i and j players [43].
Our results obtained at slow resource growth are summarized in Fig. 5. This
representative plot confirms our previous observations, namely, the effective inspection
and punishment institutions are not enough to reach a sustainable state if the resource
grow rate is too small. In this case the mentioned institutions are capable to shift the
system toward a full cooperator state but it does not help because even law-abiding
users are myopic and only consider the actual state of environment. As a conclusion,
exploiting resource based on the present shape is harmful because common resource
cannot recover this seemingly suitable usage.
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Fig 5. Individual-based simulation for slowly growing resource. Phase
portraits in x− y/RM plane for different initial conditions when r < ec < ed.
Simulation results show that the system converges to the [1, 0] state regardless of the
initial conditions. Parameters: r = 0.3, p = 0.5, N = 1000, Rm = 1000, α = 0.5,
β = 0.5, and bm = 0.5.
When the intrinsic growth rate is higher, but moderate then we obtain
qualitatively similar results to those obtained by analyzing the equation system. These
observations are summarized in Fig. 6. They suggest that in this case the application
of inspection and punishment may result in the desired effect and a sustainable
environmental state can be reached. But here the efficiency of applied top-down
governance plays a decisive role in the final outcome.
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Fig 6. Individual-based simulation for moderately growing resource. Three
representative phase portraits in x− y/RM plane using different initial conditions
when ec < r < ed. Panels show results obtained at powerful (left), moderate (middle),
and weak (right) external institutions. Depending on the effectiveness of inspection
and punishment a sustainable state can be reached for the first two cases. The specific
values are p = 0.5 and β = 0.5 in panel A; p = 0.05 and β = 0.5 in panel B; and
p = 0.01 and β = 0.1 in panel C. Other parameters are r = 0.6, N = 1000, Rm = 1000,
α = 0.5, and bm = 0.5 for all cases.
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Finally we summarize our observations in Fig. 7 obtained for the rapidly growing
resource case. These results are again in agreement with the prediction of equation
system. More precisely, full D state, stable coexistence of C and D strategies, or full C
state can also be obtained in dependence of the strength of inspection and punishment.
The latter, however, have only second order importance because the fast recovery of
environmental resource pool is capable to maintain a sustainable state for all cases.
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Fig 7. Individual-based simulation for rapidly growing resource. Three
representative phase portraits in x− y/RM plane using different initial conditions
when ec < ed < r. Panels show results obtained at powerful (left), moderate (middle),
and weak (right) external institutions. Due to large growth rate a sustainable state
can always be maintained. The strength of inspection and punishment determines only
the level of this state. The specific values are p = 0.5, 0.2, and 0.1 for panel A, B, and
C, respectively. Other parameters are r = 1.0, N = 1000, Rm = 1000, α = 0.5,
β = 0.5, and bm = 0.5 for all cases.
Discussion
The surprising efficiency of evolutionary game theory in understanding our complex
world in widely different scales makes possible to predict the long-term consequences
of individual actions on resource management [44, 45]. Our principal aim is to develop
a realistic model where there is a coupling between the behavior of players and the
developing state of a common pool resource. More precisely, we consider not just
exploitation of the resource but also take account into the fact that the environmental
common pool can be renewable. The latter may be captured by a single parameter
which characterizes the intrinsic growth rate of the resource.
In this more realistic model of a coupled social-resource system, we further
introduce a top-down-like control mechanism that serves to block overexploitation of
the common resource. This control mechanism is not only motivated by theoretical
works or lab experiments [20, 33, 46], but is also stimulated by realistic field
investigations focusing on the forest commons management [34, 47]. In contrast to a
bottom-up self-regulation this top-down-type control assumes an effective external
monitoring of agents. We have then shown that overexploitation is not the only
danger of a sustainable state. In particular, it is not enough to restrict our share to a
limit that is estimated from the actual abundance of the common resource, but we
should also consider simultaneously the growing capacity of the latter. For example, if
the growth rate is too small then even strong inspection and punishment are unable to
prevent us from a depleted resource. Taking the other extreme, if the growth rate is
high enough then the mentioned institutions have role only in how high resource level
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is stabilized, but we can always keep a sustainable state. As we pointed out
monitoring overexploitation and punishing it has critical role at an intermediate
growth rate of environmental resource, when efficient institutions can reverse the final
destination of evolutionary process.
Renewable resources are generally believed to play key roles in achieving a
sustainable human development [48]. Indeed, they are essential but we must consider
not only temporal changes in environmental conditions but also their intrinsic features
when designing their sustainable usage [33]. Otherwise our additional efforts to control
participants become useless. Conceptually similar conclusion can also be obtained
when ostracism is introduced as a collective control mechanisms into another coupled
social-resource model proposed by Tavoni et al. [15]. It is found that the stationary
state of cooperators and defectors does not only depend on the ostracism strength, but
also on the resource inflow [33]. We thus conclude that when we design a social control
mechanism to solve the overexploitation problem in a coupled social-resource system
we should first pay attention to the intrinsic features of the system which can
determine in advance whether the designed control mechanism is capable to drive the
level of common resource toward the desired direction.
Finally, we note that our model of dynamical cooperation and renewable
environmental resource uses several simplifying assumptions and is just a first step
toward a more sophisticated coevolutionary model. Still, we strongly believe that our
results could be helpful to understand the role of growing capacity of renewable
resources in designing control mechanism of punishment for governing the commons.
On the other hand, we may consider to relax or extend these simplifying
assumptions for future research in order to understand better the coevolutionary
dynamics of renewable resources and human cooperation in specific conditions. More
precisely, in the present work we have considered that individual payoff in the
replicator equation is identified as individual income originated directly from the
common-pool resource. Indeed, there should exist a transformation relationship
between individual income and payoff, which can be reflected by the production
function [15]. Thus incorporating such production function into our current model
could be a further step toward a more realistic description. Meanwhile it is also
interesting to study whether such transformation relationship can influence the
evolutionary outcome in the coevolutionary framework we proposed. Second, as
pointed out in Ref. [16] there exists a relative speed by which human behaviors modify
the resource state, which was not considered in the framework of present model.
Hence, a possible extension of our work could be to consider the relative changing
speed between the resource dynamics and the cooperation level in the population.
Third, we have considered a well-mixed interaction between agents where the
environmental feedback was valid globally. Evidently, one may consider a structured
population where both interactions and feedback from environment act locally, hence
opening a new research path toward more realistic situations.
Supporting Information
SI Text. Supporting Information for: Punishment and inspection for governing the
commons in a feedback-evolving game.
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In this text, we provide the theoretical analysis of the equilibrium points in the
following special cases.
1 For 0 < r = ec < ed
In this case, we have r = bmN
Rm
. Accordingly, the equation system becomes


x˙ = x(1 − x)(pβ −
y
Rm
bmα)
y˙ = −αry + αrxy −
ry2
Rm
.
Then the system has two fixed points in the parameter space, which are [0, 0] and
[1, 0], respectively. Here the largest eigenvalue of J(0, 0) is positive, thus the fixed
point [0, 0] is unstable.
For the fixed point [1, 0], we have
J(1, 0) =
[
−pβ 0
0 0
]
.
Then we cannot determine the stability of this fixed point based only on the
eigenvalues of the Jacobian. Instead, we study its stability by further using the center
manifold theorem [1]. To do that, we take x− 1 = z, then the equation system becomes

y˙ = αryz −
ry2
Rm
z˙ = −pβz +
αbmyz
Rm
− pβz2 +
αbmyz
2
Rm
.
Using the center manifold theorem, we have that z = h(y) is a center manifold for the
above system. We start to try h(y) = O(|y|2), which yields the reduced system
y˙ = −
ry2
Rm
+O(|y|3).
Since the fraction r
Rm
is nonzero, the fixed point y = 0 of the reduced system is
unstable. Consequently, the fixed point [1, 0] is unstable as well [1].
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2 For 0 < ec < r < ed and αbm(1−
ec
r
) = pβ
In this case, we have 1 + 1
α
− Rmr
αbmN
+ pβRmr
α2b2
m
N
< 1 and Rm −
Nbm
r
= pβRm
αbm
. As a result,
there are three fixed points in the parameter space, which are [0, 0], [1, 0], and
[1, Rm −
Nbm
r
], respectively.
The fixed points [0, 0] and [1, 0] are both unstable since the largest eigenvalues of
J(0, 0) and J(1, 0) are both positive.
For the fixed point [1, Rm −
Nbm
r
], we have
J(1, Rm −
Nbm
r
) =
[
0 0
Npβ Nbm−Rmr
Rm
]
,
in which one eigenvalue is zero and the other eigenvalue is negative. Accordingly, we
study its stability by further using the center manifold theorem [1]. To do that, we
take x− 1 = z and w = y − (Rm −
Nbm
r
), then the equation system becomes

z˙ = −z(z + 1)[pβ −
αbm(rw +Rmr −Nbm)
Rmr
]
w˙ =
[r(Rm + w) −Nbm](αbmNz − rw)
Rmr
.
We further let M be a matrix whose columns are the eigenvectors of J(1, Rm −
Nbm
r
),
which can be written as
M =
[
Rmr−Nbm
NpβRm
0
1 1
]
.
Then we have
M−1J(1, Rm −
Nbm
r
)M =
[
0 0
0 Nbm−Rmr
Rmr
]
.
We further take [u v]T =M−1[z w]T , and thus we have u = NpβRm
Rmr−Nbm
z and
v = w − u. It leads to
u˙ =
αbm
Rm
uv +
αbm
Rm
u2 +
ru2v
RmN
+
ru3
RmN
.
Using the center manifold theorem, we have that v = h(u) is a center manifold. We
start to try h(u) = O(|u|2), which yields the reduced system
u˙ =
αbm
Rm
u2 +
u3
RmN
+O(|u|4).
Since αbm
Rm
6= 0, the fixed point u = 0 of the reduced system is unstable.
Consequently, the fixed point [1, Rm −
Nbm
r
] of the original system is unstable [1].
3 For 0 < ec < r = ed
In this case, we have 1 + 1
α
− Rmr
αbmN
= 0. In dependence of the efficiency of inspection
and punishment we can further distinguish three following subcases.
(1) For bmα(1−
ec
r
) < pβ
We then have 1 + 1
α
− Rmr
αbmN
+ pβRmr
α2b2
m
N
= pβRmr
α2b2
m
N
> 1. As a result, the system has
three fixed points in the parameter space. They are [0, 0], [1, 0], and [1, Rm −
Nbm
r
],
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respectively. According to the sign of the largest eigenvalues in the Jacobian matrices,
[0, 0] and [1, 0] are unstable, while [1, Rm −
Nbm
r
] is a stable fixed point.
(2) For bmα(1−
ec
r
) > pβ
We then have 1 + 1
α
− Rmr
αbmN
+ pβRmr
α2b2
m
N
= pβRmr
α2b2
m
N
< 1. As a result, the system has
four fixed points in the parameter space. They are [0, 0], [1, 0], [1, Rm −
Nbm
r
], and
[ pβRmr
α2b2
m
N
, pβRm
αbm
], respectively. The first three fixed points are all unstable since the sign
of the largest eigenvalues of the Jacobian matrices are all positive, while the last fixed
point is stable because the term pβRmr
αb2
m
N
− Rmr
Nbm
+ 1 is negative.
(3) For bmα(1−
ec
r
) = pβ
We then have 1 + 1
α
− Rmr
αbmN
+ pβRmr
α2b2
m
N
= pβRmr
α2b2
m
N
= 1 and Rm −
Nbm
r
= pβRm
αbm
. As a
result, the system has three fixed points in the parameter space. They are [0, 0], [1, 0],
and [1, pβRm
αbm
], respectively.
The fixed points [0, 0] and [1, 0] are both unstable since the largest eigenvalues of
J(0, 0) and J(1, 0) are both positive.
For the fixed point [1, pβRm
αbm
], we have
J(1, pβRm
αbm
) =
[
0 0
Npβ − pβr
αbm
]
,
in which one eigenvalue is zero and the other eigenvalue is negative. Accordingly, we
study its stability by further using the center manifold theorem [1]. To do that, we
take x− 1 = z and w = y − pβRm
αbm
, then the equation system becomes


z˙ =
α
Rm
bmz(z + 1)w
w˙ = −
r
Rm
(w +
pβRm
αbm
)2 +
Nαbm
Rm
(z + 1)(w +
pβRm
αbm
).
We further let M be a matrix whose columns are the eigenvectors of J(1, pβRm
αbm
),
which can be written as
M =
[
r
αbmN
0
1 1
]
.
Then we have
M−1J(1, pβr
αbm
)M =
[
0 0
0 − pβr
αbm
]
.
We further take [u v]T =M−1[z w]T , and thus we have u = αbmN
r
z and
v = w − u. It leads to
u˙ =
αbm
Rm
uv +
αbm
Rm
u2 +
ru2v
RmN
+
ru3
RmN
.
Using the center manifold theorem, we have that v = h(u) is a center manifold. We
start to try h(u) = O(|u|2), which yields the reduced system
u˙ =
αbm
Rm
u2 +
u3
RmN
+O(|u|4).
Since αbm
Rm
6= 0, the fixed point u = 0 of the reduced system is unstable.
Consequently, the fixed point [1, pβr
αbm
] of the original system is unstable [1].
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4 For 0 < ec < ed < r and αbm(1−
ec
r
) = pβ
In this case, we have 1 + 1
α
− Rmr
αbmN
+ pβRmr
α2b2
m
N
= 1 and Rm −
Nbm
r
= pβRm
αbm
. As a result,
there are four fixed points, which are [0, 0], [1, 0], [0, Rm −
Nbm(1+α)
r
], and
[1, Rm −
Nbm
r
], respectively. The first three fixed points are all unstable since the sign
of the largest eigenvalues of the Jacobian matrices are all positive. In addition, based
on the theoretical analysis in Sec. 2 of this text, we can conclude that the fixed point
[1, Rm −
Nbm
r
] is also unstable.
5 For 0 < ec < ed < r and αbm(1−
ed
r ) = pβ
In this case, we have 1 + 1
α
− Rmr
αbmN
+ pβRmr
α2b2
m
N
= 0 and Rm −
Nbm(1+α)
r
= pβRm
αbm
. As a
result, the system has four fixed points in the parameter space. They are [0, 0], [1, 0],
[1, Rm −
Nbm
r
], and [0, pβRm
αbm
], respectively.
The fixed points [0, 0], [1, 0], and [1, Rm −
Nbm
r
] are all unstable since the largest
eigenvalues of J(0, 0), J(1, 0), and J(1, Rm −
Nbm
r
) are all positive.
For the fixed point [0, pβRm
αbm
], we have
J(0, pβRm
αbm
) =
[
0 0
Npβ − pβr
αbm
]
,
in which one eigenvalue is zero and the other eigenvalue is negative. Accordingly, we
study its stability by using again the center manifold theorem [1]. To do that, we take
x = z and w = y − pβRm
αbm
, then the equation system becomes

z˙ =
αbm
Rm
z(z − 1)w
w˙ = −Nbm(1 + α− αz)(
w
Rm
+
pβ
αbm
) + r(w +
pβRm
αbm
)(1 −
w
Rm
−
pβ
αbm
).
We further let M be a matrix whose columns are the eigenvectors of J(0, pβRm
αbm
),
which can be written as
M =
[
r
αbmN
0
1 1
]
.
Then we have
M−1J(0, pβr
αbm
)M =
[
0 0
0 − pβr
αbm
]
.
We further take [u v]T =M−1[z w]T , and thus we have u = αbmN
r
z and
v = w − u. It leads to
u˙ = −
r
RmN
uv −
r
RmN
u2 +
r2u2v
RmαbmN2
+
r2u3
RmαbmN2
.
Using the center manifold theorem, we have that v = h(u) is a center manifold. We
start to try h(u) = O(|u|2), which yields the reduced system
u˙ = −
r
RmN
u2 +
r2u3
RmαbmN2
+O(|u|4).
Since the fraction r
RmN
is nonzero, the fixed point u = 0 of the reduced system is
unstable. Consequently, the fixed point [0, pβRm
αbm
] of the original system is unstable [1].
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